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Summary findings
Deardorff examines the special role that trade  trade services, the greater the gains from reductions in
liberalization in services industries can play in stimulating  the costs of services.
trade in both services and goods. International trade in  The incentives for such fragmentation can be greater
goods requires inputs from such trade services as  across countries than within countries because of the
transportation,  insurance, and finance, for example.  greater differences in factor prices and technologies. But
Restrictions on services across borders and within  the service costs of international fragmentation can also
foreign countries add costs and barriers to international  be larger, especially if regulations and restrictions impede
trade. Liberalizing trade in services could also facilitate  the international provision of services. As a result, trade
trade in goods, providing more benefits than one might  liberalization in services can stimulate the fragmentation
expect from analysis merely of the services trade.  of production  of both goods and services, thus increasing
T o emphasize the point, Deardorff notes that the  international trade and the gains from trade even further.
benefits for trade are arguably enhanced by the  Since fragmentation seems to characterize an
phenomenon of fragmentation. The more that  increasing portion of world specialization, the
production  processes become split across locations, with  importance of service liberalization is growing apace.
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I.  Introduction
A signal accomplishment  of the Uruguay  Round  of multilateral  trade negotiations  was the
incorporation  of trade in services  into a GATT-like  framework  within  the World  Trade
Organization.  The incentive  to acknowledge  even  the existence  of trade in services  came
primarily  from U.S. private-sector  service  providers  who  chafed  under  restrictions  that
limited  their ability  to operate  in foreign  markets. They  were understandably  envious  of
the institutional  facilities  made available  to goods  traders  by the General  Agreement  on
Tariffs  and Trade (GATT)  for limiting  barriers  to market  access. These  service  providers
succeeded  in rnaking  the case, first in the United  States and  then in the GATT
negotiations,  that similar  rules should  apply to international  service  transactions. The
result was the General  Agreement  on Trade in Services,  GATS,  which  is now one of three
rather unequal  pillars  of the WTO.' The GATS  has so far not accomplished  very much in
the way of actual liberalization.  But the framework  for negotiation  that it provides  for the
next  round of trade negotiations  promises  to foster  a process  that  many hope will
' I have benefited from discussions of the topic of this paper with Bernard Hoekman, Bob Stern, Kathleen
Trask, and Jaume Ventura.
' The other two are the GATT itself and the agreement on trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPs).
See Deardorff (1997) for a more complete discussion of the World Trade Organization.eventually  do for trade in services  what fifty years  of GATT  negotiations  did for trade in
goods.
The motive  for liberalizing  trade in services,  coming  as it did from the service
industries  themselves,  was to permit  rationalization  of service  activities  along  the lines of
comparative  advantage. It was also,  not incidentally,  intended  to expand  the sales and
profits  of those service  providers  who were operating  from the base of such a
comparative  advantage. In this sense,  the benefits  from  trade liberalization  in services,  as
well as the costs to those without  comparative  advantage,  are the same as those  that trade
theory has long attributed  to liberalization  of trade in goods. Indeed,  many have argued
that the fundamentals  of trade in services  are really  no different  from trade in goods,  and
only the difficulties  of measuring  and monitoring  trade in services  make it distinctive,
from a practical  policy  perspective. 2
However,  for many services  the benefits  from  liberalization  extend,  in a sense,
beyond  this, and that is what I will focus on in this paper. Many services  play a critical
facilitating  role in the international  trade of products  other  than themselves,  including
both goods and other services. This is most obviously  true of transportation  services,
which  are necessary  for all international  trade in goods. But it is also  true, perhaps  to a
lesser  extent,  of other services  such  as finance,  insurance,  and communication,  as well as
some  professional  services  that are often needed  in order  to complete  the international
exchange  of goods. And  this is equally  if not more  true of international  exchange  of
services  themselves. Tourism,  for example,  depends  critically  on international  provision
of passenger  transportation.
2It follows,  therefore,  that liberalization  of trade in services  can generate  benefits
beyond  the service  sectors  themselves  by reducing  the real barriers  to trade in other
sectors. This is not entirely  unique  to services,  of course. Much  trade in goods  is of
intermediate  products, 3 and liberalization  of goods  trade yields  many of its benefits  not to
consumers  directly,  but by reducing  the costs of other  goods. But the mechanism  by
which  service  trade can stimulate  goods  trade  is somewhat  different,  and it bears
examination  in its own right. That will be the main purpose  of this paper: to illustrate,
with simple  trade theory,  how  liberalization  of trade in services  can enhance  the gains
from trade in goods.
I will do this first, in section  II, by using the standard  partial equilibrium  trade
model  to compare  the benefits  of trade liberalization  in goods  with those from reduced
costs of trading  that might arise  from liberalization  of trade in services. In section  III, I
add the role of trade services  to the discussion,  and then  in section  IV I write  down a
more  specific  framework  for determining  and decomposing  their costs. This
decomposition  allows me to identify  and focus  on the several  ways that these costs  can be
reduced  by permitting  service  providers  to operate  across  national  borders. The gains
here  include  the gains from exploiting  comparative  advantage,  of course,  but they also go
beyond  this by permitting  providers  to avoid  duplication  of certain  fixed costs, and
perhaps  by allowing  them to operate  over shorter  distances. In section  V, I provide  a
brief  discussion  of several  specific  types  of trade services,  and the extent  to which  they
conform  to the more general  description  of my model.
2 See,  among  others,  Deardorff  (1985).
3The benefits from services liberalization become larger if we also add another
phenomenon that has been attracting increasing attention recently among trade
economists:  fragmentation.  Suppose that technologies permit production of goods tc be
fragmented across countries - split into parts that can be done in different locations - and
suppose also that fragmentation, like trade, requires additional inputs of internationally
provided services. If those services are unavailable or prohibitively expensive,
fragmentation will not occur. But as technology and/or trade liberalization in services
make them available or bring down their costs, fragmentation will become viable after
all.  Thus liberalization of services trade can yield even further benefits by permitting
greater fragmentation-based trade. This is not fundamentally any different from other
gains from trade.  But I will argue, in section VI, that it has the potential to be
quantitatively more important.
The importance of all of this, as I mention in my concluding section VII, is
increasing as negotiations within the WTO continue to reduce barriers to trade and as
resistance to globalization also mounts.  When this paper was first commissioned and
drafted, a new round of WTO negotiations seemed imminent.  That is no longer the case,
after the events in Seattle in late 1999.4  However, more limited negotiations within the
WTO continue, and there is nonetheless scope for extending the liberalization that has
already begun, especially in services. The arguments of this paper suggest that the
payoffs may be particularly great for expanding the coverage and effectiveness of the
GATS.
3 Sanyal  and Jones (1982),  in fact, argued  that all trade  is of  intermediate  products,  what  they called
"middle  products."
4II.  Gains  from  Reductions  in Trade  Barriers
To start,  let us look at the conventional  benefits  from  trade liberalization.  That is,
consider  a good that is imported  from a large world  market  subject  to a tariff. Figure 1
shows  in two panels what the effects  of lowering  that  tariff will be, under  two different
assumptions.  Panel A shows  what happens  if the initial tariff is not  prohibitive,  while
panel B shows  the prohibitive  case. In both,  the new  tariff is positive  and permits  trade.
The downward  sloping line in each  panel shows  the demand  for imports  of a good  within
the importing  country,  while  pw is the given  world price.
In panel A, the initial  tariff, t,, raises  the price of imports  to pw+tl,,  which  is below
the intercept  of the demand  curve  and therefore  permits  a quantity  of the good, ql, to be
imported. When  the tariff drops  to t2, the price  falls to pw+t 2, and the quantity  of imports
rises  to q2. The welfare  effects  of this are well-known:  Consumer  surplus  (net of
producer  surplus  for competing  domestic  producers)  rises from area  a to area a+b+c,
while  tariff revenue  changes  from b+d  to d+e. The net effect  is that the country's welfare
rises by the shaded  area, c+e. It is perhaps  worth noting  that if the tariff had fallen  to
zero,  then the net gain  would  also include  areaf:
In panel B, the initial  tariff is high enough  to drive  imports  to zero, and  the
domestic  price is elevated  by less than  the tariff,  just to the intercept  of the demand  curve.
Here there is no tariff revenue  to be lost from tariff  reduction,  and  the country  gains  the
entire  shaded  areas a+b, composed  of the increase  in consumer  surplus  a and tariff
revenue  b. The gain in welfare  appears  to be much larger  here, but note  that the tariff
reduction  is also much larger. A tariff cut comparable  to that in panel A would have
4 See Deardorff  and Stern  (2000) for some  discussion  of those  events.
5yielded  less, but since  it would  include  the revenue  from the higher new  tariff, it might
still be larger  than the gain  in panel A. In contrast,  if the new  tariff were zero  in this case,
then again areaf would  be added  to the country's net gain.
Now suppose  that trade is not costless,  as so far assumed,  but rather that to get
goods to the domestic  market from  the world market,  where  they  were bought at price
Pw, requires  that traders  purchase  certain  trade services,  such as transportation.  In some
ways such service  costs would  seem  to be analogous  to tariffs,  in that they add to the
domestic  cost of the imported  good. Therefore  it may  seem  that the analysis  just done for
a tariff cut would  also suffice  for analyzing  the effects  of services  liberalization,  once we
establish  that this will reduce  their costs. This is not quite right,  however,  because
service  costs of trade are real  costs, not  just transfers  to the government.  A separate
analysis  is needed.
Figure 2 repeats  Figure 1, but for the most obvious  example  of a service  cost of
trade: transportation.  The difference  from Figure 1 is that t, and t2 are replaced  by
identical  real costs of shipping,  s, and s 2. These are not transfers  to the domestic
government,  but real resource  costs. That is, they are paid  to the transportation  providers
to cover  the increased  cost of resources  that are required  for the additional  transportation
services. This could  increase  the profits or other  incomes  of the service  providers
themselves,  but I will simplify  by assuming  that their costs  are constant  and that service
markets  are competitive. It follows  that the price of the service  remains  constant  and
equal  to average  cost, therefore  yielding  no profit or other  increase  in producer  surplus  in
the service  market  itself.
6The welfare effects of this fall in shipping cost are somewhat different from the
fall in the tariff.  In panel A, the new gain for the country is the shaded area b+c, all of
which is a gain in net consumer surplus. There is no tariff revenue for the government to
lose, but on the other hand area e is now an increase in real resource costs, not just a
transfer to government.  Clearly the gain from a drop in shipping costs can be larger or
smaller than the gain from an equal drop in a tariff, depending on whether area b is
greater than or smaller than area e.  If shipping costs were to fall to zero, on the other
hand, then the gain would necessarily be larger than an equal drop in a tariff.
If transport costs are initially prohibitive, however, as in panel B, then the gain
from their decline is necessarily smaller than from an equal drop in a prohibitive tariff,
unless both of them drop to zero. The reason is simply that the new shipping cost is a
real cost, while the new tariff is not.
III.  Gains from Reductions in Barriers to Services Trade
The simplest way to think about trade liberalization in services generally is within the
same framework of Figure 1. For example, suppose we are interested in construction
services, which can potentially be provided by work crews from a foreign company, so
long as they are permitted to operate within the domestic country and are not taxed too
heavily.  Figure 1 will apply exactly to this case, panel A for a case in which imports of
construction services are subject to additional taxes or other fees paid to the local
government, panel B to the case where foreign providers are simply excluded.  Similarly,
suppose that foreign construction companies are allowed to operate within the country but
subject to requirements that they jump through various real hoops not required of
domestic companies.  Then the case is that of Figure 2, which of course could also
7include the actual  transport  costs  of getting  their crews and equipment  to the country's
borders.
In general,  then,  the gains  from trade liberalization  in services  may be very much
analogous  to liberalization  of tariff and non-tariff  barriers  to trade in goods,  and this trade
may be analyzed  in the same  ways. This is a point  that I and others  made when trade in
services  first began to be discussed,  as in Deardorff  (1985).
However,  there is one category  of services  that has some  special  features  worth
noting: trade services. By these  I mean any services  the demands  for which  arise directly
from trade itself,  presumably  from trade in other industries. Perhaps  these services  car,
also be analyzed  with the tools above,  but their special  features  make  them worth looking
at specifically.
The prototypical  trade service  is transportation.  I will focus mostly  on that, and
my terminology  will reflect  that, but there are certainly  other  services  that have these
features  as well, as I will discuss  later.
The key is that since  trade by definition  crosses  national  borders,  any services  that
cater to that trade are likely  to be needed  on both sides  of the border  as well. But if trade
in services  is not permitted  - that is, if service  providers  are not allowed  to operate  across
these borders  - then  trade itself is likely  to be more costly, if it is possible  at all.
An example  comes  easily to mind in the case of transportation.  As I understand
it, prior to the North American  Free Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA),  Mexican  truckers  were
not allowed  to operate  within  the United  States,  nor U.S. truckers  inside Mexico. If a
good was to be shipped  by truck between  the two countries,  then it had to be carried  on
8one country's trucks to the border, unloaded, and then reloaded onto the other country's
trucks at the border, and finally shipped the rest of the way.
The costs of this awkward arrangement are obvious, and surely large. Even
assuming that the countries allowed the trucks far enough inside their borders to permit
them to unload and reload on the same lot, so that they did not have to hand-carry goods
across the border, this restriction of trucking added to the transportation process a wholly
unnecessary step of unloading and reloading.
In addition, it must surely be true that trucking firms incur a portion of other fixed
costs that do not vary with distance shipped,' and that had to be duplicated by firms from
both countries every time a good was traded in this way. Adding any other sources of
increasing returns to scale and distance that might be present in transportation
technology, and one can easily imagine that trade costs were greatly enhanced by this
prohibition on (literally) cross-border provision of transportation.
This trucking example will provide the template for my rudimentary model of
cross-border provision of trade services. But before I embark on the modeling, however,
let me stress the importance of all this, for which the model itself is unnecessary. The
point will be that trade in trade services brings down the real cost of trade.  The benefits
from this may be represented by movement along a demand curve for the service itself,
like those of Figures 1 and 2 applied to the service industries, but that misses what is so
important about these services.  Rather, by allowing cross border provision of trade
services we bring down the costs of trade in other things, not just for those services but
for everything else.  Thus, while a reduced barrier to trade in construction services will
9increase net consumer surplus of demanders of buildings, a reduced barrier to trade in
transportation or another trade service will increase net consumer surplus in every
industry where trade in the product can avail itself of those services.  We're talkin' big
bucks here, or at least big utils.
IV.  A Model of Trade Services
Consider any service, such as transportation, that provides an input that is useful for
accomplishing the trade in a good or goods. Output of the trade service is measured in
some appropriate units, such as units of the good transported, value of the good insured,
etc.  Output may also be characterized by one or more other dimensions that are
important for determining the usefulness of the service to traders, such as distance or
speed, although I will initially allow for neither of these and later, in this paper, will
incorporate only distance.  In all cases I will focus on the service associated with a
particular shipment of a good, S, from a foreign country, F, to the home country, H.  I am
interested in determining what gives rise to the portion of the cost of shipping the good
that arises from input of a some arbitrary trade service, and how this trade-service cost
may change as we liberalize trade in the service industry.  This cost may be thought of as
one component of the shipping cost examined in Figure 2.
To start with, suppose that the per unit cost of the trade service - what I will now
call the shipping cost, s - is simply constant, at a rate c that varies across countries where
the service providers may be based, in response to the usual determinants of comparative
advantage. That is, service providers from country I, will have a constant cost cI(AI wl)
Loading and unloading are themselves such fixed costs.
10where AI is the technology available in country I for providing this trade service and wI is
a vector of factor prices, including wages, in country I.  Together, these two arguments
embody the usual Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin determinants of comparative
advantage, the latter entering through relative factor endowments that determine factor
prices in general equilibrium.  In general these may themselves depend on the openness
of trade in services, although that is not something I will allow for here.
Suppose that initially there is no trade in services, and that the home country
permits this particular trade service to be provided only by domestic firms with costs
CH(AH,wH).  Liberalization of trade in services would presumably permit these services
to be supplied by a provider based in the foreign country, F, from which the good is being
imported. Its costs are cF(AF,wF). Or the service might come from a provider based in
some third country, I, with costs cI(AIWI).  If either of these is lower than cH(AH,wH),
then we have the usual gains from trade arising from comparative advantage. However,
as noted above, these gains will manifest themselves in lower trade costs of other
industries.
Following the trucking example that I mentioned above, however, I will now
complicate the service technology, allowing its unit cost per amount shipped to depend
on both quantity shipped and distance.  Consider again a shipment S of a good from an
arbitrary location A to another location B. The quantity shipped is QS. Then, using a
service provider from country I, the total cost of the service for the shipment is assumed
to take the following form:
C'  =CO + CIQS + C 2DAB + C3QsDAB  (1)
11where the parameters ci, like c above, depend on technology and factor prices in country
I:
C =  (Co,...,CO)=  (co  (Al W )'  C3(A', w'  ))  ('
The first of these parameters, co, is a fixed cost per shipment that does not depend
on the quantity shipped, nor on the distance shipped. It's presence does not imply the
existence of increasing returns to scale, in the usual sense, since it will be repeated for
every shipment that the service firm administers.  However, it does imply that the cost per
unit shipped, sI=CIIQS, declines with the quantity shipped. An example would be the
bureaucratic requirements for getting permission for a shipment.  The cl parameter is
simply cost per unit shipped, analogous to the only cost allowed above, such as the cost
of loading and unloading.  Parameters c2 and c3, on the other hand, involve distance. c 2 is
a cost per unit of distance, but note that it does not depend on quantity shipped, and
therefore should be thought of as another fixed cost.  It too will cause s to decline with
quantity shipped.  In the trucking example, this would include much of the variable cost
of transportation, such as the driver's wage, which depends on time spent on the road but
not on how much is in the truck.  Finally, C 3 is a cost that depends on both distance and
quantity, such as part of the fuel cost in transportation that depends on both distance and
load.
In general, then, the service cost of a shipment depends on both the quantity
shipped and distance, through parameters that in turn depend on technology and factor
prices of the country providing the service:
C'  = C(Qs, D; A', w')  (3)
12The service cost per unit shipped, s, is this divided by QS, which I will abbreviate as
sI(D), since I will not be varying QS:
s'  CI/Qs=C(Qs  D;A',w')/QS=sI(D)  (4)
That is the technology, and some notation to represent it. Now I make a critical
assumption about policy:  I assume that, in the absence of trade in services, service
providers are permitted to operate only in their own countries.  What this means, for the
services needed to accomplish a shipment from foreign country F to home country H, is
that only a Foreign service provider can service the shipment up to the border, and only a
home-country provider can service it from there on.  Thus I will represent the origin of
the shipment as location F, within country F, and the destination a location in H called H.
But no service provider is permitted to service it the whole way.  Instead, there is a
location B on the border between the countries (or perhaps in international waters), where
one provider stops and the other takes over.
With this assumption, the total service cost for the shipment in service autarky
becomes
CA?r1  =CF(QS  DFB;AF  ,WF)+CH  (Qs,D,,;AH,  WH)
= (cF  +c  H) + (cF  + cl)Qs  (5)
FcDrB  +cHDBH  + C3 Q  DFB +CHQSDBH
and the service cost per unit shipped - again in service autarky - is
sAut  =[CF(QS  , DF.;AF  WF)+CH(Q  SDBH;AHWH)]  QS
(C  +C  (CF +CH)  (6)
+ C2DFB  +  2 DBH  +(CFDFB  +C3DBH)
13If trade in services is now permitted, service for the entire shipment will be
provided by a single provider, and in general it may or may not be a provider from one of
the two countries who are trading the good.  Let country L, which may be H or F, have
the lowest cost of providing the service for this particular route from point F to point H.
not necessarily passing through point B.  This then is the cost if free cross-border
provision of services is permitted:
S  5ree  =  DL  =  Q$  +C  2  +  +C  DFH s  =s  (DFH  )  Q+c;I  Qs  3
< min[sF (DH),  sH(DFH)]
H,F 
This cost is evidently lower than the cost in autarky, sAut.  To see the several
ways that cross-border provision of services can reduce these costs, I now decompose the
cost reduction into three parts, numbered 1, 2, and 3, as follows:
Aul  FreeL
AUI  -Free  =5SF(D  ) + S  (DBH)-  (DFH)
1: = [s  (DFB)  SL(DFB)]+  [S  H(DBH  )  SL(DBH)]
2: +  QS + C  L[(DFB  + DBH)-DFH]  (8)
3: + I  °S  + CL(2-1)
1.  Comparative Advantage:  The first line of the decomposition in (8) is the
conventional gains from trade due to comparative advantage. It includes the cost
reduction that is possible if a different producer, operating from a different base of
comparative advantage, does essentially what was being done before. That is,
continuing to service the shipment in two parts within each country, we replace the
service providers in both with the low-cost provider that may operate from a different
14country  and that therefore,  with better  technology  and/or  different  factor prices,  may
be able to provide  the service  for lower  cost. Of course  it is possible  that the low-cost
provider  is from one of these  two countries  themselves,  in which case  one of the
bracketed  terms in line 1 is zero. These  gains  may  be large or small depending  on the
importance  of comparative  advantage  in this context.  They  may even  be negative,  if
the low-cost  provider's  advantage  derives  mainly  from servicing  longer  distances  than
these internal  ones.
2.  Reduced  Distance: It is possible  that the border  location,  through  which  trade must
pass if service  trade is not permitted,  happens  to lie exactly  on the least  cost trade
route between  the two countries,  in which  case  the second  effect  identified  above will
be zero. But in general  this will not be the case,  and a more direct  route  will exist that
bypasses  that particular  border  location. In general,  therefore,  there will be some  cost
savings  simply  from traversing  and servicing  a shorter  distance,  as DFH <DFB +
DBH.
3.  Elimination  of Fixed Costs: The most important  cost savings,  however,  is likely  to
be found in line 3 of the decomposition.  By switching  from two service  providers  to
a single one, even if they  both have  the same  technology  (as they  do in line 3), the
need is eliminated  to incur  two sets of fixed  costs. That is, those  costs  that do not
vary with distance,  but instead  are incurred  for each shipment  regardless  of distance
and perhaps  in proportion  to output,  are needlessly  duplicated  when  two providers
share  the task. One whole set of these fixed  costs is therefore  saved  when the task is
unified. To stress  this, I have included  the arithmetically  unnecessary  expression
15"(2-1)"  in line 3 of the decomposition, to remind us that fixed costs are being reduced
from twice the curly-bracketed expression to only one times it.  Of course, whether
this is in fact a large source of cost savings depends on the size of these fixed costs,
which could for some technologies be negligible.  But casual observation suggests
that it is often large.
This is all that my model has to say directly about the cost savings from cross-
I  -der provision of trade services. However, realistically, there are several more such
sources of savings that may enter, and these should be mentioned even though they do
not appear explicitly in the model.
4.  Economies  of distance: This one is in the model, at least partially, but it is hard lo
separate from the other effects. Different service technologies may be more or less
well suited to serving shipments over longer distances, and often those suited for
longer distances will not be commercially viable for the short distances that lie only
inside of countries.  The specification of technology used above incorporates this
feature, to an extent, through the cost parameters that do and do not vary with
distance.  Thus the least cost provider may achieve that low cost, once trade is free,
primarily because its costs that vary with distance are small compared to its fixed
costs that do not. As mentioned above, either or both bracketed expressions in line 1
of (8) could be small or even negative if the low cost provider is inefficient over short
distances, and the cost savings from the more appropriate technology would then be
merged into the savings from reduced fixed costs in line 3. Perhaps more
importantly, the formulation here has not allowed for any choice of techniques, except
16across  providers. But in fact such  choices  do exist, and even  a domestic  provider  that
currently  services  only short routes  may  substitute  more  appropriate  techniques  once
service  trade makes them useful. This substitution,  if it occurred,  could only reduce
costs further.
5.  Economies  of scale: As I stressed  above,  the formulation  here,  despite  appearance,
does not include  any economies  of scale. That  is, a service  provider  saves  nothing  in
costs by serving multiple  shipments  of the same  size and distance. Yet such
economies  of scale  undoubtedly  exist as well,  in some  trade-service  industries  just as
in many  other industries. As cross-border  provision  of services  permits  more efficient
providers  to displace  those less  efficient,  the surviving  firms will become  larger and
may therefore  have lower  costs. There is nothing  new  about this effect,  but once
again  it should  be remembered  that this cost saving  too, if it happens,  will stimulate
trade and the gains  from trade in the industries  whose  trade relies on it.
6.  Border  Frictions: In the model  here,  the worst that happens  when a trade route is
arbitrarily  divided  across  service  providers  from  the two countries  is that they simply
do their work back  to back. In fact, when  impediments  to cross-border  provision  of
services  exist, it is likely  that the costs of interfacing  between  the two providers  will
be higher. In the U.S.-Mexican  trucking  example  that motivated  my model,  one can
easily imagine  that  the costs  of transferring  a cargo  from a Mexican  truck to an
American  one will exceed  just the costs of unloading  and then  reloading. If the
equipment  used by both trucking  companies  are not compatible,  it may be necessary
to repack  a load or transfer  it also to another  shipping  container. If procedures  used
by the two work crews are not the same,  additional  inefficiencies  may arise  from the
17effort to make them conform. At a minimum, one may simply need a roof over the
heads of the workers and their cargo, something that would have been provided
naturally at the origin and destination of the shipment. These additional costs could
have been included in the model here, at the cost of a bit more notation, but it seems
enough merely to point them out separately.
7.  Time:  I mentioned earlier that an important dimension of service provision is time.
but I did not include it explicitly in the model here. No doubt the time cost associated
with different modes of trade servicing could mostly be included implicitly in the
parameters of this model.  But it is worth mentioning separately as well, since
reduced time costs seem likely to be one of the important benefits of cross-border
service provision. When services must be provided by separate institutional entities. it
is almost inevitable that time will be wasted in coordinating them.  This is time that
could easily have been saved if a single provider were permitted to handle the whole
job.  In a world where timely provision of inputs and outputs has become one of the
most critical elements of competitive success, these time benefits must be far from
trivial.
8.  Regulatory Costs: Many services are regulated by governments. To the extent that
these regulations exclude foreign services providers completely, then of course
liberalization of services trade means changing these regulations.  In some cases,
however, foreign service providers are permitted to operate within a country, but the
regulations that apply to them increase their costs compared to domestic firms.  For
example, trucking companies may be permitted to carry cargo into a country but not
out, forcing them to bear the cost of returning the trucks to their home market empty.
18Regulations may also require that certain categories of demanders - especially
government agencies themselves - use domestic providers.  Like nontariff barriers in
goods, these asymmetric regulations undermine competition and efficiency, and their
removal will be beneficial.  In addition, applying the same regulations to both foreign
and domestic service providers may facilitate the use of a single provider for an entire
transaction, permitting the sort of cost reduction that has been the subject of this
paper.
9.  Red Tape Costs:  Even if the same regulations apply to both foreign and domestic
providers in an industry, it may still be necessary to bear the costs of satisfying these
regulations in both countries in order to service a complete international transaction.
This was mentioned above as one of the sources of the fixed cost, co, in the model, but
the duplication of this cost will not be eliminated merely by permitting providers to
operate in both countries subject to their domestic regulations.  They will still have to
fill out forms in both countries, undergo inspections in both, etc.  Services trade
liberalization therefore needs to include provisions for either harmonizing the
regulations themselves across countries, so that a single set of procedures will satisfy
regulators in both, or it should include mutual recognition agreements whereby firms
need only be certified in one country in order to operate in both.  Of course, this raises
difficult issues when countries disagree on what levels of regulation are needed to
protect their citizens' health and safety. But only if this problem is resolved can the
full benefits of cross-border service trade be enjoyed.
19V.  Specific Trade Services
The discussion so far has attempted to be general, saying things that may apply to any
and all trade services. In this section I say a few words about each of several specific and
familiar trade services, primarily to address whether they seem to fit well or poorly into
the mold of this model.  In addition, in some cases, I will acknowledge special
characteristics of these specific trade services that may make them particularly important
for enhancing trade in goods. 6
Transport Services
The model was largely motivated, as said above, by the example of trucking
services between Mexico and the United States. It therefore seems to fit best the
circumstances of transport services more generally. Certainly, transportation services of
all sorts are characterized by costs that vary with both quantity shipped and distance.  In
addition, there routinely exist fixed costs per shipment that are independent of quantity,
distance, or both, such as take-off and landing costs of aircraft, maintenance of railway
tracks, and the pay of stevedores in ocean shipping.
Policies regulating the cross-border provision of transport services are apparently
as widely varied as the services themselves, but they are notoriously encumbered by
restrictions favoring national suppliers.  These range from restrictions on domestic flights
by international carriers to the notorious Jones Act restrictions on ocean shipping within
U.S. territorial waters.  Some of these restrictions are meant less to protect domestic
suppliers than to protect favored categories of labor, often at the suppliers' expense, and
20thus seem to operate more directly on the cost parameters of an industry than on who can
operate.  But either way, one can expect liberalization of trade in transport services to
greatly lower the costs of trade.
Insurance
International trade is inevitably more risky than domestic trade, because of the
broader range of unpredictable shocks to which it is subject from climate, culture, and
government interference, not to mention the financial uncertainty of different national
currencies and markets.  Insurance to protect against these uncertainties is therefore an
essential input to international trade, even more so than to domestic commerce. For
many of these uncertainties, it is not strictly necessary for the insurance provider to
operate physically in a foreign territory, and therefore much of the required insurance can
be provided completely by a domestic carrier within, say, the exporter's country of origin.
The principal gain from trade in insurance services may therefore be the availability of
lower cost insurance from a foreign carrier - the gain attributed to comparative advantage
above.
However, there are surely some risks associated with trade within a foreign
country that are not well covered by a domestic carrier. Indeed, some risks may not even
be recognized as requiring insurance, leaving a trader exposed to risks that they are not
aware of, but that they could have known if they had hired the services of a local provider
as well.  As a result, the prudent international trading company is likely to require the
services of several insurance companies specializing in their several countries of
6 See Hoekman and Primo Braga (1997) for a useful discussion of many actual barriers to trade in services.
21operation.  And as in the transport case, the costs of this more complete coverage is likely
to be reduced if a single provider, operating routinely in all relevant markets, can provide
the coverage.
In other words, while the terminology of the model here was largely taken from
the transport industry, it seems likely that it fits the market for insurance as well, although
perhaps to a lesser extent.
Communication
Increasingly in the modem world, intemational trade requires rapid and effective
communication to specify the details of a transaction and tailor them to the needs of all
concerned.  It would be hard to overestimate the importance of modem communication
technologies for the growth of world trade in recent decades. And yet to a surprising
extent, communications are still encumbered by different national standards and
restrictions on who can use them, forcing intemational businesses to work around these
restrictions by patching together pieces from different companies and different
technologies.  The rise of the internet is changing much of that, and perhaps such national
restrictions on communications will lose their bite as this occurs.  But greater freedom ,or
communication firms to operate world-wide will nonetheless still serve a purpose of
facilitating trade.
Travel Services
Much of the travel industry - both passenger transportation and other services
such as hotels, restaurants, and local transportation - is geared to tourists and therefore
22not directly relevant here except as a category of trade itself that relies heavily on trade
services.  However, these same services are also used by those who travel on business,
and these are an essential input to international trade.  In spite of advances in long-
distance communication, the on-site presence of people in face-to-face contact and
engaged in direct oversight of activities continues to be essential for international
commerce.  Travel services are therefore a nontrivial input to international trade, even in
goods.
Like the other categories of trade services considered here, travel services can be
provided more efficiently if done by single, or at least allied, providers that span national
borders, so as to coordinate reservations and other aspects of their service.  Much of this
has already been facilitated in recent years by the formation of international networks of
airlines and hotel chains, but these are seldom as efficient as a single larger or merged
firm operating across borders.
Professional  Services
International transactions, no less than domestic ones, require the services of all
manner of professionals.  Lawyers are needed to vet contracts with both domestic an
foreign suppliers and customers. Accountants must keep the books in a manner
compatible with different national requirements. Expansion of a company's operations is
likely to require the services in different countries of architects, contractors, real estate
agents, and the like. In each case, the service must be tailored to the local market, so that
it may seem that separate providers are necessarily called for.  However, the services
must also be integrated and compatible with what is being done by the same firm in other
23countries, and this requires effective communication among them.  This is most easily
accomplished if the national-based providers work together regularly, as they would if
they were part of a single multinational service company. Looked at in this way, the
costs of professional services may not be all that different from others discussed here.
And for many such services, such as law, professionals from one jurisdiction are
prohibited from practicing in another.
Financial Services
The final service category I will consider is financial services. This includes a
wide variety of services that are necessary for international trade, ranging from export
financing to foreign exchange. However, this is the one category where it is not obvious,
to me at least, that international provision of the services is really necessary.  Most of a
trading firm's financial needs can be met, I suppose, within a national firm that knows the
client well, and except for minor transactions, like providing currency to the firm's
overseas travelers, the national firm need not have a presence abroad.
However, this does not in any way diminish the importance of the financial
services themselves, or mean that well-functioning world financial markets are not
critically necessary for international trade.  In Deardorff (2000), 1 examine the disruption
that can be caused for trade by a financial crisis that undermines confidence in a nation's
currency and its financial institutions.  To the extent that more integrated world financial
markets can lessen the likelihood of such disruptions, trade and the gains from trade will
be among the beneficiaries.
24VI. Fragmentation
The focus here has been on various ways that liberalization of trade in services may
reduce the costs of trade, and thereby lead to gains from trade as discussed in Section II.
The potential for such gains has arguably expanded in recent years as production
processes have become more and more fragmented into smaller pieces done in different
locations.  This process of fragmentation has appeared in the literature of international
trade in several forms and under several names - such as international specialization,
outsourcing, and even globalization.! A common theme has been that fragmentation
permits countries to specialize ever more finely in the bits of production processes in
which they have the greatest comparative advantage, and that by locating these different
bits in different countries and coordinating them internationally, the world economy can
achieve ever greater gains in productive efficiency.
The process of fragmentation is not at all new, but it has been newly extended in
recent decades in part by technological changes that have made the international
coordination of fragmented production increasingly feasible.  These technologies have
primarily appeared in service industries, where more rapid and effective transportation
and communication across countries has been a precondition for reducing the costs of
final products by producing them in stages in different countries. As a result, the
international provision of many services has come to play a larger and larger role in
' Although there may be slight differences in what various authors mean by the terms they use, this list of
variations on the theme of fragmentation includes "disintegration" Feenstra (1998), "internationalization"
Grossman and Helpman (1999), "intra-product specialization" Arndt (1997), "multistage production" Dixit
and Grossman (1982), and "vertical specialization" Hummels et al. (1998).  Others have used standard
terms such as "subcontracting" and "outsourcing" (Feenstra and Hanson 1996) to address what are
certainly important aspects of the phenomenon.  I follow Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) using the term
"fragmentation."
25international  trade, even  beyond  what it was when products  were more typically  produced
in one place.
This expanded  role of services  due to fragmentation  also gives  rise to additional
potential  gains from further  reductions  in the costs of services,  such as have been  the
focus of this paper. In one sense,  one can simply  think  of the effects  of reduced  trade
costs depicted  in Figure 2 as being repeated  over an ever  larger number  of traded
fragments,  and thus multiplying  the gains  from trade.
Another  approach  is shown  in Figure  3, which  is adapted  from Deardorff  (1999).
There,  the gains  from trade in a simple  Ricardian  trade  model  are contrasted  with the
gains from fragmentation  in the same  model. The Ricardian  straight-line  transformation
curve for two goods  without  fragmentation  is shown  as the line Q1 Q 2, and the level of
consumption  in autarky  as point CAut. Conventional  trade allows  the country  to
specialize  in good 1, producing  at Q 1and trading  at world prices given by the slope  of
line Q 1A to achieve  consumption  at point CFree. If the technology  for good 1  becomes
fragmented,  however,  then  the country  can specialize  in just one fragment  - whichever
one it produces  relatively  most cheaply  - and trade the fragment  on the world market for
a larger quantity  of good 1 than it could  have produced  itself without  fragmentation,  Q,'.
The country's budget line  trading  on the world market  is therefore  shifted  out by
fragmentation,  and it can achieve  the higher consumption  level CFrag. The message  here
is that fragmentation  expands  a country's consumption  possibility  set, not just by
improving  its terms of trade of one final good for another,  but by expanding  the
26maximum attainable amount of all final goods, almost as though by an improvement in
productivity. 8
But fragmentation also involves much greater inputs of services than would be
needed for trade in final goods only, in order to coordinate the fragments. Therefore,
these gains are conditional upon the availability of such services at low cost.  The recent
emergence of fragmentation as an increasingly important phenomenon in the global
economy owes its existence to technological improvements that have brought these costs
down to historically low levels. The additional benefits from even greater fragmentation
will depend on lowering these costs still further through the sorts of liberalization of trade
in services that have been examined in this paper.
VII. Conclusion
The message of this paper is that there is tremendous scope for the world to benefit by
liberalizing trade in services.  This is especially true for trade in what I have called trade
services - those that facilitate trade in goods and in other services.  By bringing down the
costs of trade services, liberalization can generate benefits that are not confined only to
the services markets themselves, but that will appear in the markets for every other kind
of trade that they facilitate.
The paper has examined a variety of ways that removing barriers to the cross-
border provision of trade services can lower their costs. These include the gains that
conventionally arise from comparative advantage, but in the framework presented here
8 It is not literally  that production  possibilities  are necessarily  expanded  by fragmentation,  as explained
more fully  in Deardorff  (1998),  where  production  possibilities  are viewed  in three dimensions  including
27there are additional gains as well that are plausibly larger. These arise especially when
restrictions in services markets require that the services needed to facilitate a single trade
must be provided by two different national service providers.  When that is the case,
removal of such restrictions has the added benefit of eliminating duplicated fixed costs.
Regardless of the size of any cost reduction in trade services, the benefits for trade
are arguably enhanced by the phenomenon of fragmentation.  The more that production
processes become split across locations, with the fragments tied together and coordinated
by various trade services, the greater are the gains from reductions in service costs.  Since
fragmentation seems to characterize an increasing portion of world specialization and
trade, the importance of service liberalization is growing apace.
All of this is particularly timely right now, as the world hesitates in its forward
movement toward more liberal trade.  The creation of the World Trade Organization and
the GATS provided a framework for making real progress in reducing barriers to trade in
services. Had a new trade round been inaugurated at the Seattle 1999 ministerial
meeting, as expected, then the arguments made in this paper could have buttressed the
case for intensive negotiations in services, where the payoffs can be so great.  As it is,
however, the timing and perhaps even the likelihood of a new round is in doubt.  A
backlash against many aspects of globalization now questions the benefits and the equity
of reducing trade barriers and constraining trade policies.  How these issues will be
resolved is not yet clear, but it does seem evident that the benefits from services
liberalization are immune to many of these objections.  I would hope that the members of
both  an intermediate  input  and the final  product,  as well as the other  good that  both may  be traded  for.
28the WTO will be able to move ahead in services liberalization even as other aspects of the
WTO agenda may be stalled.
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